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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes selected offshore environmental and safety laws
originating from both the United States and the United Kingdom. More spe-
cifically, this paper bifurcates the two national regimes, as much as possible,
into two separate chapters whilst simultaneously examining relevant legal al-
terations stemming from the Deepwater Horizon, or Macondo, incident.
* The author has an LLM with commendation honors from the University of Aberdeen in
energy law; his J.D. was completed at the Florida A&M University College of Law. The author wishes
to share his gratitude for his wife, Amber Ray, due to her kindness and support, and to his dear friend,
Jason S. Duey, who assisted with a final look over part of this article.
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United States environmental laws are reviewed and analyzed first.
United States regulatory issues based on engineering concerns and the safety
regime are analyzed in the second half of the United States Chapter. The
analysis therein questions whether the United States truly dealt with
Macondo issues, or whether the issues were effectively tabled. The current
state of the United States regime indicates that it is either in a transitional
phase or it has failed to implement key measures which effectively utilize the
post-Macondo regulations.
The United Kingdom's offshore safety and environmental legislation
and regulations are first reviewed prior to a discussion on changes in the
United Kingdom regime that are attributable to the Macondo incident. The
question of whether the United Kingdom is actively learning or rather play-
ing the proverbial dog and pony show may be dramatic as a statement, but is
nonetheless keenly to the point. A type of tongue-in-cheek acknowledgement
that the United Kingdom regime is fit for purpose, whilst simultaneously or-
dering large investigations seems contradictory in nature and is one form of
issue that is addressed in the United Kingdom analysis.
The importance of revisiting issues from the Macondo incident could be
argued as self-explanatory given: 1) the dynamic nature of deep water explo-
ration and 2) the need to search deeper on the continental shelf in order to
meet growing energy needs. However, whilst this paper was being
researched and written, a gas blowout occurred on the United States conti-
nental shelf. Whilst the reason behind the blowout has not been publicly
identified, it stands as a current reminder that the dynamic nature of offshore
oil and gas requires continued study and regulatory refinement in order to
keep pace with an industry that will continue to press into ever changing
environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' and United Kingdom's post-Macondo safety and
environmental legal regimes are either deficient or nonresponsive to
threats presented in their oversight of deep water drilling environments.
This paper focuses on the regulatory changes, or lack thereof, in the na-
tional legal regimes of the United States and United Kingdom after the
Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. Most information regarding BP is
either presented for background or stated as an example of the holding
potential for a regulatory improvement. Safety in this article is focused on
process or technical safety instead of personal safety in order to keep the
topic narrow.
The Macondo blowout killed eleven people and spilled 4.9 million bar-
rels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.' Another concern exists whereby the
1. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, Report to the
President 11, 87 (2011) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION].
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chemicals used to mitigate the damage of the oil spill predicate environ-
mental damage. Substantial quantities of dispersants were used in efforts
to mitigate environmental damage to sensitive ecological areas.2 However,
the long-term effects of oil spills and the concomitant usage of dispersants
were not thoroughly evaluated, thereby remaining scientifically debatable.'
The potential danger of the oil spill and use of dispersants intruding into
the food chain was quickly realized and the unbridled use of dispersants
was curtailed.'
An analysis of the substantive regulatory changes in a post-Macondo
regime benefits the interests of both the United States' and United King-
dom's energy regimes. The relevance and importance of this article to the
United States can be shown by the continuing problems the United States
seems to have in the Gulf of Mexico. At the time of writing this article, the
best demonstration of issues in the United States' offshore regime is the
blowout, subsequent fire, and continuing flow of hydrocarbons from the
South Timbalier 220 block in the Gulf of Mexico.5 The BSEE indicated a
relief well is tentatively scheduled to be in place in September 2013.6 Fur-
ther, a comparative analysis allows an interesting critique that could reveal
regulatory shortcomings or best practices from either regime. Regulatory
successes and failures have provided substantive adaptive reforms designed
to mitigate safety and environmental concerns in offshore oil and gas de-
velopment. As the industry moves into deeper and more dynamic waters,
the lessons of the Macondo incident may prove vital.
The United States' regime stands to potentially benefit from an analy-
sis of another mature offshore legal regime, in this case, the United King-
dom. The United Kingdom possesses experience with amending
regulations in light of previous offshore disasters.7 The United Kingdom
similarly benefits through a comparative analysis of a mature regime that is
in the process of learning from a catastrophe. As stated earlier, this article
presents an analysis of each regime and then follows up with suggestions to
maximize the impact and relevance to the industry and regulators.
This paper is a combination of socio-legal research and comparative
analysis. The technical merits of offshore safety and environmental con-
cerns create an opportunity to utilize multidisciplinary research. The oil
2. Id. at 143-45.
3. See id. at 144.
4. See id. at 160; See also Christopher M. laquinto, A Silent Spring in Deep Water?: Proposing
Front-End Regulation of Dispersants After the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 39 B.C. ENVTL. APP. L.
REV. 419, 447-48 (2012).
5. Press Release, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, BSEE and Coast Guard
Respond to Well Control Event in Gulf of Mexico, 55 Miles Offshore Louisiana (July 23, 2013), http://
www.bsee.gov/bsee-newsroom/press-releases/2013/press07242013/.
6. Press Release, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Visual Observation Inside
South Timbalier 220 Well (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.bsee.gov/bsee-newsroom/press-releases/2013/
press08O82013z/.
7. See generally MINISTRY OF POWER, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE Acci-
DENT TO THE DRILLING RIG SEA GEM (1967) [hereinafter SEA GEM INQUIRY]; HON. WILLIAM CUL-
LEN, THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE PIPER ALPHA DISASTER (1990) [hereinafter Cullen Report].
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and gas industry, operating on a multi-national level, sets up a prime op-
portunity for one state to learn from another's regulatory regime.8 How-
ever, it must be acknowledged that each state must tailor its regime to meet
specific domestic needs. This article is intended to address the narrow is-
sues highlighted by the Macondo disaster, and to proffer regulatory sugges-
tions if appropriate. Further research into this area of law could be useful.
Part one outlines the topic itself, the article's importance, limitations
of the issue, and the process or methodology by which the discussion will
be derived. Part two provides a background from which the Macondo inci-
dent occurred by introducing the various barriers that failed. Parts three
and four provide an overview of the general state laws, and then proceed to
a substantive analysis of the United States and United Kingdom regimes
that could conceivably address the failures resulting in the Macondo disas-
ter. Part five provides conclusions and recommendations over this issue.
II. BACKGROUND
On April 20, 2010, an unfortunate series of events unfolded leading to
a loss of well control and, eventually, the Macondo disaster.' The initial
explosion of the Deepwater Horizon killed eleven people, culminating with
the rig itself sinking two days later.10 Before the blowout could be capped
in the coming months, nearly five million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf
of Mexico, creating an environmental disaster.1 Emeritus Professor An-
drew Hopkins of the Australian National University has written extensively
in the area of industrial safety, specifically safety regarding the oil and gas
industry. Hopkins aptly elucidated the complex and sequential nature of
failures in multiple barriers or "defences in depth" that created a cata-
strophic event-a massive high-pressure blowout.12 Hopkins' analysis was,
primarily, an engineer-centric view with nominal consideration for the de-
fenses in depth of the regulatory regimes.
This paper acknowledges the corporate responsibility for safety and
the concomitant governmental responsibility to ensure that the corporate
actors provide the requisite safety programs, procedures, and culture to op-
erate in a safe and environmentally sustainable manner. However, this pa-
per does not assert that BP, or any other company, intentionally usurped
its own safety obligations. Yet, the connection between BP's corporate cul-
ture and the remainder of the defenses that failed are herein noted. For
8. See MIKE MCCONVILLE ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS FOR LAW 87-89 (Mike McConville &
Wing Hong Chui eds., Edinburgh University Press 2012).
9. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 55.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 87.
12. See ANDREW HOPKINS, DISASTROUS DECISIONS: THE HUMAN AND ORGANISATIONAL
CAUSES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO BLOWOUT 53-72 (CCH Australia Unlimited 2012).
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example, Bergin portrayed BP's corporate culture as one hell-bent on cost
cutting regardless of significant safety issues.
13
Regulatory defenses that are relevant to Hopkins' assertions will be
analyzed as well as other defenses achievable via regulation. The cement
job, intended to temporarily abandon the well until a permanent produc-
tion rig was in place, was a physical barrier that failed and was attributed to
a combination of poor decisions. 4 The cement evaluation log, according to
Hopkins, was a safety barrier that failed because it was not utilized.' 5 The
negative pressure test also failed to stop the blowout from occurring.'
6
Failure of proper monitoring was another barrier that did not stop the dis-
aster. 7 The crew's failure to respond to signs suggesting inconsistencies of
positive well control in an expeditious manner resulted in another barrier
that failed.18 On the rig, the decision to not divert the spewing hydrocar-
bons and the very design of the rig, in failing to fireproof the engine room,
were overlooked barriers and missed opportunities that failed to prevent
the disaster.' 9 The failure of the regulator is an equally significant contri-
bution to that of the engineering issues above.2 0
III. UNITED STATES REGIME
Hydrocarbons have been exploited from the offshore waters of the
United States, namely the Gulf of Mexico, since 1938.21 Realizing the im-
portance of offshore resources, President Truman claimed federal authority
over resources present on the United States Continental Shelf (USCS).12
Strife between the states and federal government within the United States
brought about the Submerged Lands Act (SLA),2 3 which was a compro-
mise that validated previous leases and assigned waters within the first
three nautical miles of their respective states, excluding Texas and Florida,
which were given larger tracts due to historical claims.2 4
Internationally, the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf (UNCS) soon bolstered the Truman Proclamation's assertion of
13. See TOM BEROIN, SPILLS AND SPIN: THE INSIDE STORY OF BP (Random House Business
Books 2011); see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-up Call: Lessons From BP's Deepwa-
ter Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 7, 21, 60 (2011).
14. See HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 55; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING & NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, BLOWOUT: MACONDO WELL DEEPWA-
TER HORIZON 25-39 (National Academies Press, Washington D.C. 2012) [hereinafter NAE].
15. HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 56.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 56-57.
18. Id. at 7.
19. HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 62-64.
20. See James E. Darling, Addendum: The Story of the BP Oil Spill, 3 ELON L. REV. 254, 271
(2011-2012).
21. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, The
History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States, Long Version (Staff Working Paper No. 22, 2012)
[hereinafter History of Offshore Oil].
22. See Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Oct. 2, 1945).
23. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2012).
24. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1312 (2012).
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national claims to offshore resources."5 The 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is particularly important for estab-
lishing the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by which each state
has authority over the natural resources contained within. 6 Ian Brownlie,
a renowned authority on public international law, is keen to address the
UNCLOS as creating duties of states to "respect ... the protection and
conservation of the marine environment.
27
The offshore hydrocarbon industry grew exponentially in the United
States. The industry pushed the technological limits by venturing further
out onto the continental shelf into incrementally deeper waters.2 8 The hy-
drocarbon industry advanced faster and farther than general industry
safety practices or than governmental regulation could keep pace with;
prompting legislative attempts to control the industry after each major
incident.29
By the time of the Macondo incident, the United States implemented a
plethora of regulations to govern the offshore hydrocarbon industry, but
the regulatory agencies had a dearth understanding of technical knowl-
edge30 and a severe lack of resources to provide a meaningful contribution
to offshore safety or environmental oversight.3' Other legal instruments
that were designed to regulate offshore oil and gas exploration and produc-
tion were the: National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),32 Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (OPA),33 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),34
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),35 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act,36 Endangered Species Act (ESA),
37
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 38 and the National Marine
Sanctuaries Act (NMSA).39 The Presidential Commission identified sev-
eral instances of regulatory failure, many of which are discussed within this
article.
After the Macondo disaster, the regulator, Mineral Management Ser-
vice (MMS), was reorganized into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Manage-
ment, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) and the Office of Natural
25. United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (en-
tered into force June 10, 1994) [hereinafter UNCS].
26. United States Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered
into force Nov. 16, 1994).
27. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (Oxford Univ. Press ed.,
7th ed. 2008).
28. History of Offshore Oil, supra note 21, at 7-13.
29. Id. at 13-17.
30. See NAE, supra note 14, at 113.
31. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 67.
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2012).
33. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2012).
34. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2012).
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 (2012).
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1869 (2012).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2012).
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445 (2012).
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Resources Revenue (ONRR). BOEMRE was then dissolved to form the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). The ONRR, BOEM and BSEE
are all under the Department of Interior (DOI). The ONRR covers the
economic interests in United States and Indian energy resources-includ-
ing offshore oil and gas.4° BOEM covers, inter alia, planning, NEPA analy-
sis, and environmental studies.41 The BSEE covers, inter alia, oil spill
research, inspections, oil spill response, training, and environmental
compliance.42
A. Selected Environmental Laws
Environmental legislation prior to the Macondo disaster theoretically
provided a multi-layered approach to determine the environmental impacts
of offshore activities and providing a consultation process.43 However,
MMS practice was to utilize a work-around or even to ignore legislative
environmental laws.4 4 This breakdown in the regulator created a vacuum
that was filled by cost-driven management systems. Such was the case of
BP and arguably the industry in general. 45 The Presidential Commission
addressed this issue and admitted that there is nothing inherently wrong
with a cost-driven structure.46 For corporate actors in the deep waters of
the Gulf of Mexico, a cost-driven problem surfaces where there is inade-
quate risk awareness or safety protocols to processes that are inherently
inundated with risk.47 An interesting point about the Presidential Commis-
sion's analysis, regarding the lack of risk awareness, is that it is equally as
relevant for the regulator as well. The MMS's use of legislative loopholes
could be one measure by which the regulator unwittingly sabotaged its own
risk awareness mechanisms.
1. OPA
Underestimations of potential damages from offshore oil spills left the
OPA with arbitrary financial limitations that quickly proved insufficient to
40. BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, THE UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION, FISCAL YEAR 2014, 4
(2013), available at http://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/index.cfm [hereinafter BSEE BUDGET
2014]; see also BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION, FISCAL YEAR 2014, 3-5 [here-
inafter BOEM BUDGET 2014].
41. BOEM BUDGET 2014, supra note 40, at 3-5.
42. BSEE BUDGET 2014, supra note 40, at 3-5.
43. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 84.
44. See id. at 84-85.
45. See id. at 122-26.
46. Id. at 125.
47. Id. at 122.
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cover the damage from the Macondo disaster.48  The Presidential Com-
mission recommended that "Congress should significantly increase the lia-
bility cap" to offshore facilities.49 BP and other major industry players
seem to have given substandard efforts in constructing an emergency re-
sponse plan, under the OPA.5 ° An explicit example is the non-existent, at
least in the Gulf of Mexico, sensitive marine life that BP and other major
industry players claimed they sought to protect under their respective
plans.51
2. NEPA
NEPA is a powerful environmental tool within the United States re-
gime that was forged in the wake of the Santa Barbara Channel oil spill.5
2
A duty rests within the federal government to provide an environmental
impact statement for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment. ' 53  Pettit and Newman correctly
pointed out that in certain circumstances, a simplified environmental re-
view, referred to as an environmental assessment, might be used under
NEPA.54 Further, the possibility exists to utilize a "categorical exclusion"
(CE) if no significant impact is likely to occur in the endeavor." The CE
was used liberally by the MMS prior to the Macondo incident.56 However,
the Director of BOEMRE issued an August 2010 memo that CEs in the
Gulf of Mexico were temporarily off limits until a review of department use
of CEs could be completed.57 Interestingly, the DOI also has temporal
constraints that essentially require it within thirty days to make a decision
whether to allow an offshore exploration endeavor through OCSLA.58
OCSLA is also the vessel that the BSEE would use to promulgate regula-
tions to address shortcomings in the regulatory system, which will be ana-
lyzed below.59
48. See id. at 83-85.
49. Id. at 284.
50. 30 C.F.R. § 254.23 (2011).
51. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 84.
52. See id. at 28.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (2010), and 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5
(2010).
54. David Pettit & David Newman, Federal Public Law and the Future of Oil and Gas Drilling on
the Outer Continental Shelf, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 184, 190 (2012).
55. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4(p) (2010).
56. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 81-82.
57. Memorandum from Michael Bromwich, Dir., Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Enforcement
& Regulation on Use of Categorical Exclusions in Gulf of Mexico Region, to Walter Cruickshank,
Deputy Dir., Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Enforcement and Regulation & Robert LaBelle, Acting
Assoc. Dir. For Offshore Energy & Minerals Mgmt. (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/
news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=securitygetfile&PagelD=42011.
58. See 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2012).
59. See 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012); see also, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVTL ENFORCEMENT, OIL
AND GAS SULPHUR OPERATIONS ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF-INCREASED SAFETY MEA-
SURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 6 (Docket ID: BSEE-2012-
0002, 2002) [hereinafter Final Rule].
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3. OCSLA
The OCSLA is the legislative device used in the leasing process, which
is carried out in stages. First, a five-year lease program is established.6"
Then, lease sales are held.61 Next is the exploration phase of the leased
acreage.6 2 The fourth phase is development and production.6 3 The final
phase is that the captured oil and gas is sold.64
There are key provisions in OCSLA that provide safety and environ-
mental safeguards. Exploratory drilling may not begin until an environ-
mental plan (EP) has been provided. 65 The DOI Secretary must prevent
exploration if the activity would be "unduly harmful to aquatic life in the
area" or "result in pollution" or if it would "create hazardous or unsafe
conditions" among other issues.66 On their face, these provisions create a
positive outlook and could work hand-in-hand with a type of safety case
regime. However, an Achilles heel of this otherwise fine piece of legisla-
ture is that concomitant regulations require a decision, within thirty days,
whether to approve, modify, or disapprove the EP once all needed infor-
mation is collected.67 The thirty-day time constraint effectively hamstrings
the DOI with regard to the depth in which it can evaluate an environmen-
tal assessment. A bill was introduced within the United States Congress to,
inter alia, alleviate the temporal constraint by extending the thirty-day re-
quirement to ninety days with the possibility of an additional sixty days;
moreover, the bill prohibits CEs.68 Only time will tell whether the bill
gains enough political support to become law. The time extension, if en-
acted into law, should help. However, assuming the bill does become law,
even more time may be necessary if the SEMS program is ever to be fully
utilized by requiring the regulator to approve the operator's SEMS plan
prior to allowing the operator to drill.
B. Engineering Problems and Regulatory Concerns
Hopkins delivered an eloquent elucidation of the Macondo disaster in
the form of an engineering analysis.69 Hopkins' analysis includes substan-
tive reference to the Presidential Commission and several group investiga-
tions, reports, and studies. The interdisciplinary approach of this section
should be self-evident.
60. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
61. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (2012).
62. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(a)(1) (2012).
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (2012).
64. 43 U.S.C. § 1353(a) (2012).
65. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2012).
66. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(g)(1)-(3) (2012).
67. 30 C.F.R. § 250.231(a) (2009); see also, 30 C.F.R. § 250.233 (2009).
68. H.R. 1820, 113th Cong. § 8 (2013).
69. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 12.
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1. Macondo Issues
Hopkins gave an in-depth review of the different ways the cement bar-
rier could have failed.7" The decision-making impediment of an initial dec-
laration of success was highlighted as creating a seed of poor-decision
making or even a justification of potential failures.71 Decisions based on
commercial risk factors were next in the analysis. Hopkins acknowledged
that some decisions were taken while relying upon other defenses in order
to mitigate potential harm.7" Making a decision based upon the assump-
tion that other defenses may not hold could have provided a more reliable
analysis.
A conflict of interest was an obvious thorn in the regulator's side dur-
ing the Macondo disaster. Congress could have created a body to oversee
health, safety, and environmental concerns in offshore oil and gas. Instead,
the DOI separated the departments already under it, renamed them, and
presented it as a remedy to the conflict of interest. However, the rever.ue
or licensing division and the safety and environmental division are still
under the same leadership. Yet it remains a valid question as to whether
the revenue department and the safety/environmental department both re-
porting to the secretary of the DOI is a solid solution or not. On the other
hand, BOEM has developed a recusal form that enables BOEM employees
to document their family and friends in the industry in order to be poten-
tially recused if necessary.73
Further potential failures were created from decisions regarding the
installation of the subsea Macondo well itself. The potential for instability
in the well control was increased substantially by using foam cement,74 spe-
cifically, the decision to move forward with foam cement after a test
showed instability in the slurry. Another test that was not promptly distrib-
uted revealed a higher degree of failure, and perhaps these oversights are
exemplary of the commercially driven risk assessments as opposed to pro-
cess or system safety based analysis. 75 The Presidential Commission noted
several other decisions that tend to solidify a view that BP's decision-mak-
ing process was not geared toward process safety. Briefly, these decisions
include: the use of long-string casing instead of a liner;76 the amount of
centralizers used despite data indicating potential for the loss of well con-
trol;77 the decision to use foam cement, which created a higher potential for
70. Id. at 13-51.
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 17.
73. Memorandum from Michael R. Bromwich, Dir., Bureau of Ocean Mgmt. Regulation & En-
forcement on Policy Regarding Interference with the Performance of Official & Potential Conflicts of
Interest to All BOMRE District Employees (2010), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/
BOEM/AboutBOEM/Reforms/Recusalmemo0830.pdf.
74. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 100-02, 117-18; see also HOPKINS, supra
note 12, at 22-23.
75. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 101-02; see also HOPKINS, supra note 12, at
22-23, 76.
76. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 115; see also NAE, supra note 14, at 43.
77. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 115-16.
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channeling and general lack of compressive strength; 8 the decision to ig-
nore "anomalous pressure readings";79 the decision to forgo the cement
evaluation log;8" the BP and Transocean decision to not formally train rele-
vant employees on negative pressure tests and the concomitant regulator's
decision to not provide relevant standards or regulations;81 the decision for
BP to seat the cement plug 3,300 feet below the mud line whilst also decid-
ing to replace the drilling mud with seawater, which is a lighter weight.82
2. Regulatory Response
The United States regulator, BOEMRE (now BOEM and BSEE),
used OCSLA to address critical influencers of the Macondo disaster, such
as:
casing installation; cementing requirements; independent
third party verification of blind-shear ram capability... [and]
compatibility; casing and cementing integrity tests; secon-
dary BOP intervention; function testing for subsea secon-
dary BOP intervention; documentation for BOP inspections
and maintenance; Registered Professional [must] certify
casing and cementing requirements; and [includes
mandatory] well control training to include deepwater
operations.83
The "questionable" decision-making processes surrounding the ce-
ment failures and well design have been subject to some regulatory atten-
tion.84 Hopkins discussed well integrity tests and pointed out that an
integrity test was performed shortly before gas pressure built up to a criti-
cal level and resulted in a blowout.85 The lack of an independent third
party to examine the well in order to certify well or cement integrity has
been noted as a measure that may have mitigated effects of later decisions
or prevented the disaster en totem.86 Hopkins noted the process of consen-
sus decision-making, or "groupthink," on the Macondo platform to be a
method that tends to "absolve individuals of responsibility," further sug-
gesting that responsibility should lay with one person.87 The concept of
groupthink purportedly inhibited the decision-making process of BP and
exacerbated the lack of an independent verification of the stability of the
casing and cement jobs.
78. NAE, supra note 14, at 33; see also HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 23-25.
79. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 116.
80. Id. at 117.
81. Id. at 119.
82. Id. at 119-20.
83. Final Rule, supra note 59, at 3.
84. NAE, supra note 14, at 27.
85. Id. at 37.
86. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 122.
87. HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 47-51.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Operators are currently required to use "best available and safest drill-
ing technology" in order to mitigate potential for the well to be penetrated
by hydrocarbons or kicks.88 In applying for a permit to drill (APD), the
operator must provide details of the hole, casing setting depths, assump-
tions, type and amount of cement, and ability to isolate flow zones. Moreo-
ver, the operator must do so in a statement that explains how it is
comparable to the best practices of the American Petroleum Institute's
standards.8 9 This, however, is only useful if competent regulators are em-
ployed to understand, critically evaluate, and scrutinize proposals. United
States Regulators had a lack of sufficiently educated or experienced per-
sonnel to adequately examine, question, and refute, if necessary, assertions
made from industry engineers. 90 This was evidenced through the lack of
professional cognizance displayed by failing to recognize the danger pre-
sent by the narrow margins of safety in drilling the Macondo well.91
Separate from the APD, operators now have a duty to ensure their
casing and cement programs control pressures and fluids; prevent flow of
fluids into offshore waters; "prevent communication between separate hy-
drocarbon-bearing strata[;]" "protect freshwater aquifers from contamina-
tion[;]" support "unconsolidated sediments[;]" and to have a United States
registered professional engineer to sign a certification that the casing and
cementing design is "appropriate for the purpose. '' 92 Operators must also
install two independent barriers to prevent flow of hydrocarbons should
the cement barrier fail.93 Hopkins noted that the recent United States reg-
ulations made professional engineers responsible for their decisions and
created a system of independent verification that he believes has remedied
the issue of a lack of accountability 94-an assertion that is likely to be true
for future drilling operations.
The United States regulator does, at first glance, appear to directly
address many of the well control concerns posed by the Presidential Com-
mission, the National Academy of Engineering, and Professor Hopkins'
book. However, many of the improvements mentioned thus far could be
considered as a continuance of a tick-the-box method, except now there is
a professional engineer that must be utilized to certify that the correct
boxes have been ticked.95 Perhaps this method, combined with the Safety
and Environmental Management System (SEMS) discussed later in this
chapter, was intended cumulatively to have bolstered this check on well
control past the tick-the-box mentality. As Hopkins aptly pointed out, a
88. 30 C.F.R. § 250.401(a) (2011).
89. 30 C.F.R. § 250.415(a)-(f) (2012).
90. NAE, supra note 14, at 113.
91. Id..
92. 30 C.F.R. § 250.420(a)(1)-(6) (2012).
93. 30 C.F.R. § 250.420(b)(3) (2012).
94. HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 50.
95. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.420(a)(1)-(6) (2012).
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barrier that is to be used in a defense in depth system should be
independent.96
Hopkins touched upon the problems of gas diversion and ignition con-
trol suggesting that it was poor planning to fail in making the engine room
explosion proof.97 The United States regulator seems to have dealt with
potential structural problems and testing of the diverter system. 98 Atten-
tion also seems to be paid to concerns presented by Hopkins in regard to
the reduction of the potential for explosion frequency by requiring the
crew to divert the gas overboard.99 The diverter must now direct gas, and
associated materials, "away from facilities and personnel."1 ° This may not
be necessary in every circumstance. However, the cost/benefit analysis
here seems to be one of potential minor environmental impact versus the
potential for life saving through preventative measures or a precautionary
approach.
A large emphasis has been placed on the blowout preventer. The Na-
tional Academy of Engineering, for example, devoted the largest chapter
of its book, regarding lessons learned on offshore drilling safety, to blowout
preventers. 10 ' The utilization of a blowout preventer has seen attention by
the regulator as well. The blowout preventer must now be able to shear the
drill pipe at the maximum anticipated surface pressure, including the work-
string and tubing.10 2 A third party must also verify pipe-shearing calcula-
tions.'0 3 The blowout preventer and lower marine riser package (LMRP) is
now to be brought to the surface and undergo a thorough inspection to
ensure it is fit for purpose.0 4 The third party must also be objectively qual-
ified as a licensed professional engineer, registered professional engineer,
or member of a technical classification society.'
0 5
Hopkins poignantly elucidated the lack of a viable blowout response
plan or an oil spill response plan as being the product of a "box-ticking"
mentality that had developed and led to unrealistic propositions being doc-
umented in order to satisfy the regulator.'0 6 This is not a burden that
should solely be placed upon BP, as other members of the industry have
submitted similar response plans with similar unrealistic capabilities and
incredibly inaccurate content.
10 7
There has been some shift toward a performance-based regulation that
could be intended to remedy this mentality. However, it is not entirely
convincing that there is a government-led initiative to change the safety
96. HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 53.
97. Id. at 62-65.
98. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.431-433 (2011).
99. HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 62-64.
100. 30 C.F.R. § 250.430 (2011).
101. NAE, supra note 14, at 34-56.




106. HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 65-66.
107. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 133.
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culture. The funding for the BOEM or the BSEE has not appeared to be
impressive, 0 8 nor does it seem capable of supporting the type of compre-
hensive supervision necessary to usher in a change in the way offshore bus-
iness has been done for many years. Through a general statement, the
United States Government has acknowledged that it has conscientiously
constrained financial support due to the "state of the economy and tight
fiscal constraints." 0 9 The great irony of the United States regulatory re-
gime is that it is the overseer of one of the most lucrative tax income bases
for the United States Government, 1 0 yet the regulator has been dying a
slow death from underfunding and may potentially be drifting into a realm
of indifference." 1
Perhaps it would be appropriate for the United States Congress to en-
sure that the BOEM and the BSEE do not enter the same cost-driven man-
agement that BP was vehemently criticized for. Perhaps this could be
accomplished by ensuring that adequate funding is provided in order to
enable comprehensive supervision of offshore programs. To put it another
way, view the cost of regulation and cost of environmental mitigation ver-
sus the cost of diminished revenue. For an industry that generates exten-
sive revenue, even perhaps an extensive funding or appropriation increase
would not be significant to the overall budget given the shear amount of
revenue produced. When compared to increasing well control incidents or
spill frequencies in recent history, the need for increased funding appropri-
ation becomes clearer. In 2010, "major well control spills or incidents...
[were up] over 60% from 2006. 1 112 Deeper water and more dynamic con-
ditions require competent staff and fair funding to supervise operational
and environmental safety properly.
3. SEMS
The Presidential Commission's pointing to environmental laws as be-
ing "ignored" is a mind-boggling illustration of a failure in the safety cul-
ture or a lack thereof."3 Following the Macondo disaster, the idea of
progressive regulation toward a performance-based regulatory response
was gaining ground. The flagship change of the United States regime ap-
pears to be the development and implementation of the SEMS. However,
as with any changing regime, it seems to be a work in progress, or a gradual
108. BOEM BUDGET 2014, supra note 40, at 3; see also BSEE BUDGET 2014, supra note 40, at 3;
cf. BUREAU OF OCEAN MANAGEMENT, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS: AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
FISCAL YEAR 2013 [hereinafter BOEM BUDGET 2013]; see also BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL ENFORCEMENT, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS: AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR
2013, 3 [hereinafter BSEE BUDGET 2013]; cf. BUREAU OF OCEAN MANAGEMENT, BUDGET JUSTIFICA-
TIONS: AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2012; Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Gov-
ernance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1102 (2011).
109. BOEM BUDGET 2013, supra note 108, at 3.
110. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 63.
111. See NAE, supra note 14, at 72-76, 112-13.
112. IAN SUtrroN, OFFSHORE SAFETY MANAGEMENT: IMPLEMENTING A SEMS PROGRAM 6 (El-
sevier 2012).
113. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 85.
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shift. To best understand the current regime, a brief look at events that
have changed other regimes and led to similar regime changes is
appropriate.
The Ekofisk blowout in Norway killed 123 people, and the Piper Al-
pha disaster in the United Kingdom killed 167 rig workers and two rescu-
ers.114 These disasters altered the way Norway and the United Kingdom
regulated their respective oil and gas regimes. The safety case regime de-
veloped in the United Kingdom, and a similar regime developed in Nor-
way. 1 5 Norway and the United Kingdom began the novel approach of
shifting the burden of responsibility to the operators and requiring the op-
erators to prove that each endeavor was within an acceptable margin of
safety.1 1 6 The Presidential Commission pointed out that both the Piper Al-
pha and Ekofisk involved United States oil and gas corporations. 1 17 These
examples are uniquely designed or tailored for their domestic purposes.
However, a common theme permeates. An onus is placed on the operator
to prove the endeavor is within an acceptable margin of safety, and the
respective government is supervising and taking a note from Teddy
Roosevelt: walk softly and carry a big stick.
The DOI arguably broke with the traditional United States ideology of
prescriptive regulation by instituting the SEMS. 18 The benefits of moving
away from a complete prescriptive or command and control regime have
long been realized. 19 Now the United States would require a SEMS plan
to be developed by the operator. Interestingly enough, the SEMS is not
directly proven, or even required to be delivered, to the regulator prior to
the operator being allowed to drill.' 20 Instead, the operator must merely
complete the plan, keep it on hand, and ensure it is implemented.' 2 1 This
could be the sign of a step-by-step alteration in regulation, which is under-
standable to steer massive regulations similar to a large ship-incre-
mentally. On the other hand, it could be viewed as a magnanimous hole in
the regime that could be the result in compromise between budget and
safety. Whilst it is important for the operator to ensure that the SEMS is
implemented and utilized to the fullest extent practicable, it should be in-
cumbent upon the regulator to decide first if the SEMS is appropriate or
risk losing credibility, or worse, control of offshore safety-if it has ever
had control.
114. Id. at 68-69.
115. See id. at 68-72.
116. Id. at 69.
117. Id.
118. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1900-1929 (2012).
119. Christine Parker & John Braithwaite, Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
STUDIES 123 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
120. See HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 145.
121. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.1902 (2012).
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The goal of regulation in offshore oil and gas should not be to create a
mentality of tick-the-box; it should be to foster awareness about the cir-
cumstances around the work environment and educate workers, corpora-
tions, and the regulator on how to achieve the desired outcome-here a
profitable and safe endeavor with minimal environmental impact.122 In an
attempt to achieve that goal, SEMS uses a hybrid of performance-based
regulation whilst integrating prescriptive regulation via the incorporation
of third party documents to utilize as standards. 123 The integration of stan-
dards is understandable, perhaps even highly desirable for all involved,
given the intrinsic nature of the United States regime and its proclivity to-
ward hard laws or regulations. An attempted remedy to the potential
problem of impartiality of the AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
was addressed by limiting the incorporation by reference of AMERICAN
PETROLEUM INSTITUTE documents to the specific publication, with-
out the ability to accept alterations, and without amendment to regula-
tion.' 24  The National Academy of Engineering suggested that the
incorporation of standards should be used for developing a forward think-
ing, "interactive, and reactive risk management system.'1 25 Further men-
tion was made of the need to use existing regulation and a warning that the
standards had to be "updated and revised continually."'1 26 This author is
not convinced that utilization of the AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTI-
TUTE is wise from a conflict of interest position, nor the freezing of a
standard without knowing who, how, or when amendments to the stan-
dards will be addressed.
The SEMS is a step toward an effective offshore safety regime. Hav-
ing a framework that requires the operator to critically assess the risk it is
about to undertake is a key development. However, as pointed out by
Hopkins, there are serious impediments to the current SEMS regime. 27
The lack of a requirement to at least deliver the SEMS to the regulator
may suggest the regulator may be unsure of its competence to adequately
review the plan. The historical and current acknowledged under-funding
further begs the question of whether the regulator has the ability to obtain,
maintain, and retain competent staff to allow proper function of an effec-
tive SEMS, should SEMS be fully developed. A formal method for the
operator to prove his case, that the operation is within an acceptable mar-
gin of safety, is a fundamental step toward making the SEMS effective. 28
Arguably the key for making a goal-based or performance-based program,
such as SEMS, is a general duty of care to be placed upon the operator. 29
122. Parker & Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 129.
123. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1900, 1902 (2012); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.198 (2012).
124. 30 C.F.R. § 250.198(a)(1) (2012).
125. NAE, supra note 14, at 120.
126. Id. at 120.
127. See HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 149.
128. See id. at 145-46.
129. Id. at 148.
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Hopkins noted that OSCLA does provide a general duty of care to licen-
sees, 130 to "maintain all places of employment ... free from recognized
hazards to employees." '13 1 The duty of care, however, appears to be a dead
or unused article. The SEMS, further, should be implemented, reviewed,
and enforced by an independent and competent regulator with an appro-
priate onus placed upon the operators to bear the burdens of their
endeavors.
Not all scholars, however, believe that the safety case method is appro-
priate for the United States. 3 Professor Steinzor, for example, wrote,
"the British safety case system is the wrong choice for America."'
' 33
Steinzor correctly pointed out that, statistically, the occupational or indi-
vidual worker's safety in the United States is comparable to that of the
United Kingdom.' 34 Steinzor further criticizes the approach of the United
Kingdom regulator of including numerical value of human life, and at-
tempts to differentiate United States regulatory customs and culture as
viewing this as unacceptable in general, and unacceptably low in prac-
tice . 35 This assertion is diminished in value by Steinzor's own writing ac-
knowledging that the United States performs the same computation of
assigning a value to human life. 36 Key differences appear to be that the
use in the United Kingdom of an assigned value in the final making of
regulation is perhaps viewed as bad taste or poor regulatory etiquette, and
an assertion that the United Kingdom accepts a higher risk in comparison
to the United States regime. Steinzor also pointed out, in a paragraph
quip, that secrecy involved in the process of the United Kingdom safety
case regime is against a notion of American regulatory customs or
norms.' 37 This author suggests that Steinzor's rationale for objecting to a
safety case regime in the United States is more appropriately useful as tools
to tailor a safety regime to American needs and culture. To put it another
way, as Paterson suggests, the United States could choose to use "selective
borrowing of some of the regulatory ideas" from the United Kingdom, but
not to "feel compelled to follow the British example slavishly."' 38
Another controversial matter is the independence of the regulator.
The most prominent, or at least the most visible, regulatory failure of the
United States' offshore safety regime may have been the conflict of interest
presented by comingling the safety and environmental regulators with the
130. Id.
131. 43 U.S.C. § 1348(b)(1) (2012).
132. See generally Rena Steinzor, Lessons from the North Sea: Should "Safety Cases" Come to
America?, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 417 (2011).
133. Id. at 421.
134. Id. at 431-32.
135. Id. at 434-38.
136. See id. at 424, 435.
137. Id. at 438-39.
138. John Paterson, The Significance of Regulatory Orientation in Occupational Health and Safety
Offshore, 38 B.C. ENVrL. An'. L. REV. 369, 389 (2011).
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economic or licensing body.139 The Presidential Commission recom-
mended that Congress, in conjunction with the DOI, should "create an in-
dependent agency within the Department of Interior."' 4 ° It is interesting
that the Presidential Commission recommended leaving the new safety and
environmental regulatory body within the DOI. 4' This could be viewed as
a path of least resistance as the simplest and least costly option; or the
belief that a body created by Congress could be adequately independent
from the revenue management section in the DOI-yet still the DOI de-
partment head would be responsible for both, and still subject to debate on
whether it is in-fact independent; 142 or as a practical means of achieving the
most that one can in the then existing socio-political climate.
1 43
IV. UNITED KINGDOM REGIME
The current United Kingdom safety case regime is the result of many
years of reform. Taverne succinctly notes that the United Kingdom has two
types of internal legislation: formal acts and subsidiary legislation, such as
regulations created under authority of those acts.144 Additionally, the
United Kingdom has responsibilities to abide by EU regulations and direc-
tives. The first section of the United Kingdom analysis will briefly cover
the highlights of why the United Kingdom has adapted to its goal-setting
offshore regulations. Next, an analysis of post-Macondo regulatory adap-
tions, discussions and their context will be analyzed.
A. Safety
The United Kingdom initially claimed sovereign rights over offshore
resources under a 1964 law.'45 The rush to claim resources left a legal void,
creating an impetus in the ability to regulate petroleum development. A
quick remedy that was intended to jumpstart the offshore oil industry and
provide a licensing mechanism was to export the existing onshore regula-
tions,146 via the 1964 petroleum regulations,1 47 and hope for a turn-key reg-
ulatory system.148 This regime could be described as a laissez faire order
with little thought to safety because the section that was purported to cover
139. See Leila Monroe, Restructure and Reform: Post-BP Deepwater Horizon Proposals to Im-
prove Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Activities, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 61, 73 (2011).
140. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 256.
141. Id.
142. HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 138.
143. See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 1, 3 (Clarendon
Press, Oxford 1994).
144. Bernard Taverne, An Introduction to the Regulation of the Petroleum Industry: Laws, Con-
tracts and Conventions, in INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AND RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY SERIES 48
(Thomas Walde et al. eds., Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff 1994).
145. Continental Shelf Act, 1964, c. 29, § 1 (U.K.).
146. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1 (repealed Feb. 15, 1999) (Eng.).
147. Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations, 1964, S.I. 1964/
706 (U. K.).
148. See John Paterson, Health and Safety at Work Offshore, in OIL AND GAS LAW: CURRENT
PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS 190 (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2nd ed. Dundee Univ. Press 2011).
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safety was overly vague.149 As Paterson noted, the remedies available to
redress safety issues were limited to revocation of the license and, there-
fore, limited to the "most egregious behaviour."' 5 °
The Sea Gem collapse in December of 1965 was a tragedy that would
open the government's eyes to the lack of attention paid to safety in the
law, as it existed at the time.15 ' The Minister of Power attempted to setup
an inquiry, but did not have the authority to do so.' 52 Nevertheless, an
informal inquiry was conducted. The Sea Gem Inquiry noted an inability
for the law to recognize the wording of the Institute of Petroleum Code.' 53
The Sea Gem Inquiry recognized the potential inadequacy in comprehen-
sive prescriptive regulation whilst proceeding to recommend the composi-
tion of a comprehensive regulatory regime. 54 The potential deficiencies of
prescriptive regulations were also noted. 5  However, the Sea Gem In-
quiry, in the end, recommended that the government bear the duty of
maintaining the health and safety of workers, and that a set of comprehen-
sive regulations should be enacted to that end. 56 Conversely, the Robens
Report,' 57 recognized that the offshore industry in the United Kingdom
could benefit from a more unified structure, 5 8 and presumably that struc-
ture should be a "more self-regulating system.'
'1 59
The Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act of 1971 was the
vessel that was used to promulgate the comprehensive regulations recom-
mended in the Sea Gem Inquiry. 6 ° Plagued by the time consuming nature
of drafting large-scale regulations, the Mineral Workings Act would not
produce a full set of regulations until several years later, and after produc-
tion had already begun. 16 ' Employer duties that existed under the Health
and Safety at Work, etc. Act, 1974, to maintain the health and safety of its
workers, were exported offshore.'
62
Paterson noted that the Ekofisk Bravo platform blowout in Norway
created an opportunity for the United Kingdom to learn from a disaster
that occurred within the jurisdiction of another regime-albeit an issue still
in the North Sea.' 63 The Burgoyne Committee was established, it reviewed
existing United Kingdom regulation, and submitted a report, the Burgoyne
149. See id. at 190-91.
150. Id. at 191.
151. See id. at 191.
152. Id. at 191.
153. See, SEA GEM INQUIRY, supra note 7, at 8.8.
154. Paterson, supra note 148, at 193.
155. SEA GEM INQUIRY, supra note 7, at 10.1.
156. Id. at 10.2.
157. LORD ROBENS, SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK: REPORT OF THE ROBENS COMMITTEE, 1972,
Cmnd. 5034 (U.K.) [hereinafter Robens Report].
158. Id. at J 109; see also, Paterson, supra note 148, at 198.
159. Robens Report, supra note 157, at 41.
160. Paterson, supra note 148, at 195-97.
161. Id. at 196.
162. Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act, 1974 (Application Outside Great Britain) Order, 1977,
S,J. 1977/1232.
163. Paterson, supra note 148, at 199.
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Report.'64 The Burgoyne Report agreed with the Sea Gem Inquiry in that
the duty of ensuring safety should be borne by the government and accom-
plished by regulatory oversight.165 However, as Paterson keenly eluci-
dated, 66 the Burgoyne Report would differ from the Sea Gem Inquiry by
recommending that the government accomplish its regulatory tasks by set-
ting objectives "designed to achieve a uniformly high standard of
safety."'1 67 The Burgoyne Report noted the difficulty of drafting regula-
tions "which can be readily understood by a person without legal train-
ing. '' 161 The serious lack of effective involvement of the regulator in
offshore inspections turned out to be an ominous omen of a disaster wait-
ing to happen on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS). 69
The Piper Alpha disaster occurred on the UKCS and claimed 167 lives
on July 6, 1988. The ensuing inquiry, the Cullen Inquiry, 70 became the
most authoritative and in-depth report in the oil industry ever conducted
within the United Kingdom.' 71 Professor Paterson aptly stated that the
Cullen Report "is a damning indictment of the state of safety in the United
Kingdom" during the 1980's.172 Lord Cullen recommended 106 changes,
among them the prescriptive regime on offshore safety was to be remod-
eled into, primarily, a goal-setting regulatory approach.' 73 Parliament ac-
cepted Cullen's recommendations and implemented them essentially
wholesale. 4
Interestingly enough, in the parliamentary debate regarding the Cullen
Report, Mr. Frank Doran challenged the assertion by the Secretary of State
for Energy, Mr. John Wakeham, that the "responsibility for safety has al-
ways been, and will always remain, with the operator" as an attempt by the
Secretary to evade responsibility. 175 Mr. Doran's point regarding the regu-
lator's responsibility to ensure that operators are doing what they are sup-
posed to do is key. Perhaps more importantly, the regulator should be able
to see when and what it has permitted or allowed the private industry to
do. This ideology would be embodied, in the United Kingdom, through the
safety case regime.
The Offshore Safety Act 1992 and the Offshore Installations (Safety
Case) Regulations 1992 became the initial legislative foundation of Lord
Cullen's recommendations. 176 The 1992 Safety Case Regulations would
164. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OFFSHORE SAFETY: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, 1980, Cmnd.
7866 (U.K.) [hereinafter Burgoyne Report].
165. See id. at 6.5.
166. Paterson, supra note 148, at 200.
167. Burgoyne Report, supra note 164, at 6.2.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id.
170. See generally Cullen Report, supra note 7.
171. Paterson, supra note 148, at 204.
172. Id. at 204.
173. Cullen Report, supra note 7, at 21.69.
174. 180 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) (1990) 329-44; see also 187 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) (1991)
472-567.
175. 180 Pan. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) (1990) 329, 343-44.
176. Paterson, supra note 148, at 209-11.
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prove to be too bureaucratically cumbersome, not proactive enough to ade-
quately ensure safety, and not sufficiently involving the voice of the
workforce to be effective. 77 Peripheral yet critical concerns that required
regulatory change were developing on the UKCS. For example, operators
were selling licenses to less experienced operators that were entering the
market-requiring an additional analysis on who bears liability and on how
cumbersome should regulations be. The Offshore Installations (Safety
Case) Regulations 2005 became the mode through which the United King-
dom would remedy, as best as possible, the perceived faults of the 1992
Safety Case Regulations. 78
Paterson notes two more legislative enactments that can be used to
provide punitive measures against intentional violations of offshore health
and safety regulations-The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate
Homicide Act 2007 and The Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008.1
While it is imperative for the government to have a stick to match the car-
rot, elaboration of these punitive measures, designed for intentional wrong-
doings, would be slightly outside the scope of the current analysis.
The Key Programme 3 (KP3) was an initiative by the Health and
Safety Executive that was designed to address concerns regarding the "risk
of major accidents" on the UKCS. 180 The report concluded that both man-
agement supervision and reporting to senior management were effective. 8 '
However, the report further clarified that there was poor performance re-
garding system critical elements (SCE).' 82 KP3 noted that the poor per-
formance was likely the result of "poor understanding of the function of
SCEs as barriers," risk assessments not being conducted, and severe main-
tenance issues. 183 The quagmire of these findings could be viewed as
whether the United Kingdom regime is effective in catching the grievous
safety concerns, or if it should be a damning indicator that the regime is not
effective. While it is easy to point a finger at the regulator and suggest ipso
facto failure, it would be more accurate to view it as an unintended migra-
tion of focus on occupational safety by the industry.' 84 Here, we have an
industry that operates in a dynamic environment and doing so on behalf of
shareholders that are likely heavily concerned with the balance sheet. The
government, in this instance, is responsible for ensuring that the industry
lives up to its duty of providing a safe working environment. 185 Such a role
177. Id. at 216-18.
178. See id. at 216-20.
179. Id. at 222-27.
180. HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, OFFSHORE DIVISION OF THE HAZARDOUS INSTALLA-
TIONS DIRECTORATE, KEY PROGRAMME 3: ASSET INTEGRITY PROGRAMME, 2007, at 8 [hereinafter
KP3].
181. Id. at 13.
182. Id. at 12.
183. Id. at 13.
184. See ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, UK DEEPWATER DRILLING-IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE'S SECOND
REPORT OF SESSION, 2010-2011, 3 H.C. 882.
185. See Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/3117, §§ 5(2), 16.
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is inherently indicative that poor performance is possible or even expected
at some point in order to justify the role of the regulator in this regime.
Therefore, the revelation that the industry had shortcomings in under-
standing the interconnectedness of basic infrastructure to SCEs tends to
establish that the United Kingdom regime was operating as intended in this
circumstance.186
B. Environmental
The United Kingdom has several environmental laws and numerous
regulations that justify substantial research. However, this article must
limit attention to the prominent laws and regulations affecting exploration
and production on the UKCS and the alterations of laws and regulations as
a result of the Macondo incident."8 7
Petroleum Licensing Regulations (PLR) 18 8 creates schedules, model
clauses, and assigns significant discretionary authority to the Minister of
Energy." 9 The PLR covers several points, such as: joint and several liabil-
ity of licensees,19 ability of the Minister essentially to enjoin a more com-
petent licensee in a joint venture to ensure compliance of the license,
requisite permission requirements to drill or abandon a well with few ex-
ceptions,' 9' and general duties such as "efficient and workmanlike man-
ner,"' 19 2 or "good oilfield practice."'193 Perhaps the most relevant provision
for this article is the requirement to prevent the escape of hydrocarbons. 94
The Petroleum Licensing Regulations 2008 contains similar duties as men-
tioned above and it updated the model clauses that affect licenses distrib-
uted thereafter.
195
The Assessment of Environmental Effects Regulations requires an en-
vironmental statement to be presented in order to obtain consent from the
Secretary of State in order to carry out exploration and production activi-
ties.' 96 However, discretion of the Secretary of State is permitted to obvi-
ate the requirement for an environmental statement given specific
186. KP3, supra note 180, at 14.
187. For a review of UK environmental laws: Luke Havemann, Environmental Law and Regula-
tion on the UKCS, in OIL AND GAS LAW: CURRENT PRAcrICE AND EMERGING TRENDS (Greg Gordon
et al. eds., 2nd ed., Dundee University Press 2011); see also, JANE HOLDER, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESS-
MENT: THE REGULATION OF DECISION MAKING (Oxford University Press 2004).
188. Petroleum Licensing (Exploration and Production)(Seaward and Landward Areas) Regula-
tions, 2004, S.I. 2004/352.
189. Havemann, supra note 187, at 233-34.
190. S.I. 2004/352, (Schedule 1) 1(2).
191. Id. at 7(1)-(2), (6).
192. Id. at 7(7).
193. Id. at 9(1).
194. Id. at 9(1).
195. Petroleum Licensing (Production)(Seaward Areas) Regulations, 2008, S.I. 2008/225, § 2, 23.
196. The Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipe-lines (Assessment of Environmental Effects)
Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999/360, § 5(1) [hereinafter Assessment Regulations].
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parameters. 197 If the Secretary relieves the requirement for an environ-
mental statement, then the matter is a fairly transparent and publicized
decision with particular reasons articulated in written form.
198
The Habitats Regulations requires the Secretary of State to "consult
the Joint Nature Conservation Committee and have regard to any repre-
sentations made by that body,"' 99 where activities are prone to have a "sig-
nificant effect" on habitats such as those protected under the Wild Birds
Directive. z°0 However, the Secretary of State has authority to set aside the
protections mentioned in specific instances and with particular
constraints.2 ° '
C. United Kingdom Macondo Response
The United Kingdom appears to have a multi-pronged process by
which several governmental bodies and the industry itself have launched
investigations into how the Macondo disaster could impact the United
Kingdom regime. This article will look at the DECC, the House of Com-
mons Energy and Climate Change Select Committee, the HSE, and the Oil
Spill Prevention and Response Advisory Group (OSPRAG), and their
views or responses to the incident. In the United Kingdom, there has been
no substantial legislative activity regarding offshore safety or environmen-
tal concerns that are relevant to this article.
The DECC's response, at least the immediate response, could be
viewed as a bit awkward. There was a statement by Energy Secretary Chris
Huhne that declared the United Kingdom's regime was "fit for pur-
pose."2 2 That statement was magnanimously early and has been viewed as
modestly self-contradicting when robust and public inquires were ordered
with the same breath.20 3 This could be an attempt to keep the public ap-
peased while providing time for the regulator to adequately study the prob-
lem. Interestingly enough, the legislature did not seem to be in step with
Huhne's rationale; the House of Commons Select Committee suggested
that the United States be studied to determine if a gold standard would
evolve-although no such standard has evolved to date.
House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Select Committee
(HCE Committee) has collected evidence, made conclusions or recommen-
dations, and worked with the regulatory arm of the government toward
assessing the potential issues that the Macondo incident may have revealed
in the United Kingdom regime. The HCE Committee noted many of its
197. Id. at §§ 5(2), 6.
198. Id. at § 5(10).
199. Offshore Petroleum Activities (Conservation of Habitats) Regulations, 2001, S.I. 2001/1754,
§ 5(2).
200. Id. at §§ 5(1)-(4).
201. See id. at §§ 6, 14-15.
202. Stephen Tromans & Josephine Norris, What if Deepwater Horizon Occurred West of
Shetland, INT'L ENERGY L. REV. 220, 220 (2010).
203. See id.
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questions were adequately resolved through the Safety Case Regula-
tions.2 °4 However, the HCE Committee does question the regulator on
whether it would be more prudent to utilize prescriptive regulations for
fail-safe mechanisms, namely blowout preventers.20 5 The HCE Committee
report also noted a potential flaw in the United Kingdom regime regarding
high-consequence, low-probability events, and offers the lack of a capping
device prior to the Macondo incident as evidence of that flaw.2"6 The HCE
Committee also suggested that the government monitor changes in the
United States regime and to determine if those changes would be useful in
the United Kingdom. 20 7 The government's response was a bit peculiar in
that it spent about three paragraphs describing its regulatory superiority
and how it intended to disseminate that knowledge, and included only one
sentence indicating that it would be "looking at what the United States
does. ' 2 8 Whilst there is nothing per se wrong with stating one has a supe-
rior regime, this would not be the first time that the United Kingdom regu-
lator has not taken reports or opinions into genuine consideration until
there is an incident on the UKCS.2 0 9 Perhaps one could say that the
mentality of approaching regulatory improvements in the United Kingdom
offshore regime must contend with a residual reluctance to accept concepts
not portrayed with sufficient "Britishness.
' 210
HSE's Offshore Division (OSD) setup the Deepwater Horizon Inci-
dent Review Group, which has expressed interest in the issues of well-con-
trol, and is addressing the issue by conducting more frequent assessments
of "well control issues by including this aspect at all offshore inspections of
mobile drilling rigs. ' 211 The group found that the current regime has "high
offshore regulatory standards.
212
Oil and Gas United Kingdom set up Oil Spill Prevention and Re-
sponse Advisory Group (OSPRAG). OSPRAG has developed a final re-
port that has pulled together much of its work. Advising on key issues such
as a minimum list of staff that should have formal education regarding their
critical positions, well control schemes, blowout preventer usage, record
keeping, performance standards, and audit procedures.213 The industry has
indeed keyed in on many points that were targeted by the United States
204. ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, UK DEEPWATER DRILLING-IMPLICATIONS
OF THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL, 2010-2011, H.C. 450-1.
205. Id. at 41.
206. Id. at 43.
207. Id. at 42.
208. ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, UK DEEPWATER DRILLING-IMPLICATIONS
OF THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE'S SECOND REPORT
OF SESSION, 2010-2011, H.C. 882, at 7.
209. See generally Robens Report, supra note 157; see also, Burgoyne Report, supra note 164.
210. See generally Linda Colley, Britishness and Otherness: An Argument, 31 J. BRITISH STUD. 309
(1992).
211. HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE BOARD, AN UPDATE ON OFFSHORE MATrERS, H.S.E. 11/
61, Annex 4 (2011).
212. Id.
213. See generally UK OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE ADVISORY GROUP, STRENGTHEN-
ING UK PREVENTION AND RESPONSE, FINAL REPORT (2011).
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regulator as in need of change. However, it appears to be the industry's
viewpoint that these issues are best left alone by the regulator and that
they, the industry, will deal with the matter.
The United Kingdom regime may be at risk of losing its credibility as a
gold-standard regulatory regime if it fails to adapt to lessons learned in the
industry around the globe. Malcolm Webb has suggested that the "depth
of water is not the critical element" in mitigating risk in offshore drilling, it
is the "practices and procedures employed to drill the well and to regulate"
the industry.214 This author appreciates the steadfast faith placed in the
offshore regime in the United Kingdom. Further, it is acknowledged that
the United Kingdom has undertaken several studies into the Macondo inci-
dent. However, it tacitly appears that some of these investigations have
been done with tongue-in-cheek. Or to put it differently, an answer has
been given before the question was asked. Sheldon also conceded that the
majority of United Kingdom drilling depths are different from that of the
Gulf of Mexico, but further stated that drilling in the United Kingdom is
"nevertheless deep ... remote and distant from the response infrastructure
that was available to the Macondo incident." '215
European Union legislation has previously been non-existent directly
regarding offshore oil and gas.216 Tromans and Norris claim that the
United Kingdom's offshore environmental regime is "more robust than
that applicable in the United States" and is generally a product of EU legis-
lation.2 17 However, the authors further note that it is "questionable
whether the current United Kingdom regime is immune from the criticisms
levied against the MMS" regarding the potential for conflicts of interest.218
The Deepwater Horizon incident has prompted the EU to reassess its lais-
sez faire position on the offshore industry.219 A recent EU Directive draws
a red line for the regulatory agencies, requiring the EU Member States to
"ensure the independence and objectivity of the competent authority in
carrying out its regulatory functions. '220 The status of the DECC, regard-
ing the comingling of the roles as environmental regulator and as the licen-
sor of offshore operations, appears to now be in conflict with European
law.
22 1
The United Kingdom has some room in determining how to imple-
ment this EU Directive within its jurisdiction since it is a directive as op-
posed to a regulation. However, the EU appears to have keenly focused
on one of the prominent mistakes of the American regime, the potential
214. ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, UK DEEPWATER DRILLING: IMPLICATIONS OF
THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL, FORMAL MINUTES, Q1 (Sept. 7, 2010).
215. Jeremy Sheldon, Ripples from the Gulf of Mexico, INT'L ENERGY L. REV. 12, 13 (2011).
216. Danielle Beggs et al., Post-Macondo - Offshore and EHS Regulation, INT'L ENERGY L. REV.
199, 202 (2011).
217. Tromans & Norris, supra note 202, at 222.
218. Id. at 221.
219. Beggs et al., supra note 216, at 202.
220. See Directive 2013/30 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on
Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations and Amending Directive 2004/35/EEC, art. 8(2).
221. See id. at art. 8(3).
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conflict of interest. The EU has further recognized that EU Member
States, such as the United Kingdom, are resisting recognizing that their re-
gime has correlative attributes that put their respective offshore safety and
environmental regimes at risk. It will be interesting to view whether the
United Kingdom creates an independent environmental body or merges
the environmental regulator with an existing body. The latter is likely
more economically and logistically probable. Either way, this tends to es-
tablish that the United Kingdom may not have learned all the lessons that
it could have from the Macondo incident.
V. CONCLUSION
A. United States
The largest lesson that the Macondo disaster should have taught all
involved is that the safety and environmental dangers are not separate, but,
instead, they are intrinsically intertwined. The United States has a prolific
set of environmental regulations and agencies. Minor tweaks in giving
them proverbial teeth either in substance or practice could provide
America with an abundance of positive measures for the environment and
safety.
The United States Congress should separate the offshore safety and
environmental regulator from DOI control by a dually enacted law. The
Department of Health and Human Services and the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency are turnkey agencies that could support such a
move. The legal alterations regarding authority could also be addressed by
an incorporation or delegation of authority by the DOI to the respective
external offices.
The United States regime has developed substantive prescriptive regu-
lations that appear to be commensurate with the threats presented in the
Gulf of Mexico. Well-control, particularly with casing and cementing, re-
quirements to have plans approved prior to drilling are substantive regula-
tory changes that are perhaps understandable given the developments of
the Macondo well. The requirement of an additional mechanical barrier
seems to be a direct attempt to compensate for the mistakes that led to the
Macondo incident.
Congress could redress the OCSLA temporal and general oversight
impediments through a combination of removing the thirty-day restriction,
integrating the environmental review with the SEMS, requiring the SEMS
program to be reviewed-and approved-prior to the approval to drill, and
a relative increase in the BSEE's budget to enable the regulator to accom-
plish such a task. One concern is that the piecemeal approach by Congress,
such as the attempt to set a temporal hard line of ninety days even if it has
the potential for sixty additional days, tends to establish that either the
SEMS will likely not be fully utilized in the near future or Congress is be-
ing highly inefficient. Short or even maximum review times should instead
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be minimum review periods that the BSEE has in order to review a propo-
sal to ensure that it is an adequate SEMS plan, then move forward after
verification. It should be noted that the budget increase for the regulator
would be significant if it were to address the number of personnel that have
adequate knowledge or experience to accomplish such a challenge. This
may be a topic that the United States Congress discovers that it gets what it
pays for.
SEMS is a step toward a functional goal-oriented or hybrid regime.
However, unless further steps are taken in both regulation and resource
allocation, the SEMS may fade into obscurity. If the current state of SEMS
is the extent of the regulators intention, then it does not provide substan-
tive legal protection for the United States, the environment, or for the
workers, boaters, and citizens that depend on ocean waters in America.
Funding, competent staffing, and a regulatory requirement to receive a
SEMS approval are requisite and necessary means to obtain the full poten-
tial of the SEMS program.
Overall, the United States has acknowledged key faults in the regula-
tory system prior to the Macondo incident. The regulator has addressed a
multitude of those issues. An organizational self-restructuring and recusal
policy serves to combat potential conflicts of interest. Regulations to sure
up well-control issues have been promulgated. The SEMS program serves
as a first step toward a regime change recommended by a multitude of
researchers and committee reports. However, the efficacy of the organiza-
tional restructuring is debatable. The SEMS is either incomplete or incapa-
ble of performing, as it should. Either way, the SEMS should be amended
to require regulatory approval before drilling on the USCS. The Congress
should provide adequate funding for a competent and robust staff to make
the SEMS and the BSEE as effective as possible.
B. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom regime is arguably a progressive view taken to
keep pace with the dynamic nature, rapidly advancing technology, and ever
changing best practices to mitigate risk regarding oil and gas production on
the continental shelf. Concern has been made previously regarding the ef-
ficacy of the safety case regime, in particular the KP3. However, perhaps
the largest concern could be the mixed signals that can be observed when
reviewing the United Kingdom's response to the Macondo incident. Fur-
ther study would need to be conducted regarding lessons learned on safety
and environmental issues in order to determine the extent the United
Kingdom has learned, implemented, or failed to do so. However, there are
lessons from Macondo that may or should send an alarm bell ringing for
the United Kingdom regulator.
One ringing alarm bell that is likely to pressure the United Kingdom
into learning an additional lesson from the Macondo incident is the EU
Directive that concerns separation of the environmental division from the
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
licensing division. The EU appears to have spoken with regard to its inter-
pretation of concerns in potential conflicts of interest. Perhaps equally im-
portant is the implicit realization that, in offshore oil and gas endeavors, an
environmental issue is intrinsically intertwined with safety issues.
The commingling of regulatory and economic interests in the United
Kingdom is a direct point toward showing that the United Kingdom has
not effectively learned from the Macondo incident. Questions regarding
whether it is best to provide an additional mechanical barrier for well con-
trol still has not been fully confronted by the United Kingdom.
C. United States and United Kingdom
The reluctance to accept outside ideas is an issue for both regimes.
However, both regimes are taking steps toward accepting outside ideas.
The United Kingdom committed resources to study the Macondo incident,
and it has a more secure industry as a result. The EU may have just
prompted the United Kingdom to learn, or at least be creative in explain-
ing why it will not learn, about regulatory conflicts of interest. A practical
benefit in the United Kingdom industry, and the product of learning from
the Macondo incident, is the specialized capping devices that are now avail-
able for use on the UKCS.
The United States has taken a step toward developing the SEMS.
However, the SEMS has limited effectiveness without further adjustment.
Even if mandatory approval under the SEMS prior to drilling were to take
place, it would likely be useless without proper funding and appropriate
regulatory personnel to oversee the program.
Regardless of the final decisions made in the realm of politics, both the
United States and the United Kingdom have endeavored into significant
studies regarding the Macondo incident. The knowledge of those studies
has been, and will be, used as the offshore industry ventures further off-
shore and into dynamic geological formations. Nevertheless, both states
have deficiencies, or they are nonresponsive to threats presented in their
respective regimes. Both regimes should continue to learn more from each
other as further analysis is accomplished.
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